Natural Conventions and Indirect Speech Acts


Journal article


Mandy Simons, Kevin Zollman
Philosophers' Imprint, vol. 19(9), 2019, pp. 1-26

Open Access
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APA   Click to copy
Simons, M., & Zollman, K. (2019). Natural Conventions and Indirect Speech Acts. Philosophers' Imprint, 19(9), 1–26.


Chicago/Turabian   Click to copy
Simons, Mandy, and Kevin Zollman. “Natural Conventions and Indirect Speech Acts.” Philosophers' Imprint 19, no. 9 (2019): 1–26.


MLA   Click to copy
Simons, Mandy, and Kevin Zollman. “Natural Conventions and Indirect Speech Acts.” Philosophers' Imprint, vol. 19, no. 9, 2019, pp. 1–26.


BibTeX   Click to copy

@article{mandy2019a,
  title = {Natural Conventions and Indirect Speech Acts},
  year = {2019},
  issue = {9},
  journal = {Philosophers' Imprint},
  pages = {1-26},
  volume = {19},
  author = {Simons, Mandy and Zollman, Kevin}
}

Abstract

In this paper, we develop the notion of a natural convention, and illustrate its usefulness in a detailed examination of indirect requests in English. Our treatment of convention is grounded in Lewis’s (1969) seminal account; we do not here redefine convention, but rather explore the space of possibilities within Lewis’s definition, highlighting certain types of variation that Lewis de-emphasized. Applied to the case of indirect requests, which we view through a Searlean lens, the notion of natural convention allows us to give a nuanced answer to the question: Are indirect requests conventional? In conclusion, we reflect on the consequences of our view for the understanding of the semantics/pragmatics divide.


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