Book chapter
Mandy Simons
Gerhard Preyer, chapter 14, Beyond Semantics and Pragmatics, 2018
Gerhard Preyer, chapter 14, Beyond Semantics and Pragmatics, 2018
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APA
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Simons, M. (2018). Convention, Intention and the Conversational Record. In G. Preyer (Ed.) (Vol. Beyond Semantics and Pragmatics). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791492.003.0015
Chicago/Turabian
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Simons, Mandy. “Convention, Intention and the Conversational Record.” In , edited by Gerhard Preyer. Vol. Beyond Semantics and Pragmatics, 2018.
MLA
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Simons, Mandy. Convention, Intention and the Conversational Record. Edited by Gerhard Preyer, vol. Beyond Semantics and Pragmatics, 2018, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198791492.003.0015.
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@inbook{mandy2018a,
title = {Convention, Intention and the Conversational Record},
year = {2018},
chapter = {14},
volume = {Beyond Semantics and Pragmatics},
doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198791492.003.0015},
author = {Simons, Mandy},
editor = {Preyer, Gerhard}
}
Abstract
Lepore and Stone 2015 advocate a view which turns the Gricean picture of meaning on its head: they argue that the most basic type of meaning intention is one which presupposes the notion of conventional meaning. In this essay, I argue that evidence from language acquisition supports the Gricean view, according to which communicative intentions are analytically more basic than linguistic convention. I point out further, though, that Grice’s view recognizes the role of conventionality in meaning, a point neglected in Lepore and Stone’s critique. Lepore and Stone extend their convention-driven view by advocating a model on which the Conversational Record reflects only conventionally licensed conversational updates. I present evidence from conversation that shows that such a view of the record cannot account for certain types of standard conversational events.
Lepore and Stone 2015 advocate a view which turns the Gricean picture of meaning on its head: they argue that the most basic type of meaning intention is one which presupposes the notion of conventional meaning. In this essay, I argue that evidence from language acquisition supports the Gricean view, according to which communicative intentions are analytically more basic than linguistic convention. I point out further, though, that Grice’s view recognizes the role of conventionality in meaning, a point neglected in Lepore and Stone’s critique. Lepore and Stone extend their convention-driven view by advocating a model on which the Conversational Record reflects only conventionally licensed conversational updates. I present evidence from conversation that shows that such a view of the record cannot account for certain types of standard conversational events.
